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Abstract
The growing visibility of Islam in the public spaces ofWestern societies is often interpreted
in the media as a sign of Muslim radicalisation. This article questions this postulate by
examining the flourishing Muslim marriage industry in the UK. It argues that these ‘halal’
services, increasingly popular among the young generation of British Muslims, reflect the
semantic shifting of categories away from the repertoire of Islamic jurisprudence to cultural
and identity labels visible in public space. Informed by long-term ethnographic fieldwork
in the British field of Islamic law, this article examines aMuslim speed-dating event, which
took place in central London in 2013. It investigates how Islamic morality is maintained
and negotiated in everyday social interactions rather than cultivated via discipline and the
pursuit of virtuous dispositions. UsingGoffman’s Bframe analysis^ and his interpretation of
the social as a space of Bperformances^ as well as recent anthropological reflections on
Bordinary ethics^ (Lambek) and Beveryday Islam^ (Schielke, Osella and Soares), it
examines the potential for such practices to define the contours of a new public culture
where difference is celebrated as a form of distinction.
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In the media, as well as in political discourse, the growing visibility of Islam in the
public space of Western societies is often interpreted as proof of the rise of religious
fundamentalism. This visibility is often considered problematic as it is understood as a
sign of the resurgence of orthodox religious practices. Such representations have led the
British government to establish strategies in the fight against terrorism following the
London attacks of July 7, 2005, notably the highly controversial BPreventing Violent
Extremism^ (PVE). The latter has focused exclusively on Muslims, perceived as being
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the instigators of the PVE believe they must counter the attraction of Islam for the
second and third generation, whom they perceive to be at risk of radicalization, by
promoting a Bprogressive and moderate^ English Islam.
This article questions the postulate of Bradicalisation^ by showing how Islamic
morality, as manifested in the everyday practices of young English Muslims, remains
fundamentally ambivalent, hybrid, and fluid. Using the concept of Bordinary ethics^
developed by Michael Lambek (2010) and the notion of a BIslam mondain^ developed
by Soares and Osella (2009), I argue that the moral universe of English Muslims is less
the reflection of norms imposed by religious institutions than the product of cultural
interactions and ordinary forms of sociability. I suggest that these modes of ethical
engagement should not be interpreted as signs of communitarian withdrawal but rather
as manifestations of a new public culture where religious difference is celebrated as a
form of distinction.
This article is based on twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork begun in 20081
and continued in 20122 and 2013–20143 in England (in London and in Birmingham) in
diverse spaces where Islamic norms have made their appearance, particularly amidst
the flourishing Muslim marriage industry. The methods used for this research consisted
in participant observation in ‘sharia councils’ (mistakenly called ‘sharia courts’ in the
media) as well as law firms specializing in Islamic law, observation of a working group
on Muslim marriages at the Ministry of Justice, Muslim marriage preparation courses,
professional Muslim mediation and match-making services. I also conducted inter-
views with ‘moral entrepreneurs’ and ‘shariah law’ experts in order to gain deeper
insights into their ethos and working methods. The purpose of this study was to provide
an empirically grounded representation of the Islamic legal culture of the UK as it
routinely finds expression in various spheres of life, politics, consumption, leisure and
sociability. By mapping out urban spaces where certain Bmoral rubrics^ (Deeb and
Harb 2013:19)4 drawn from sharia law take root in public life and by documenting the
everyday practices of observant Muslims striving to lead a modern and ethical lifestyle,
my aim was to study Western modernity from the perspective of its periphery. Moving
away from the methodological individualism that dominates in debates on multicultur-
alism, this work explores zones of tensions and interpenetrations between secular and
religious notions of justice, as well as the power of the collective imagination in
shaping Islamically responsible subjects.
I conceive the interactions documented in this research asmanifestations of a new ‘public
culture’ in the sense that they reveal the emergence in public of cultural, social and
potentially political expressions of differences. As Arjun Appaduraï phrases it, because of
the increased pace of migration and electronic mass mediation, Bordinary people have
begun to deploy their imagination in the practice of their everyday lives^ (1996:5). BIt is the
imagination, in its collective forms, that creates ideas (…) of moral economies and unjust
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rule (…). The imagination is today a staging ground for action, and not only for escape^
(1996:7). With the deterritorialization of culture and religion, classic forms of knowledge
and authority in Islam have been challenged and Muslims’ social imaginaries have found
new sources of inspiration. Globalization – understood here as a process of intensification of
world-wide social relations and economic exchanges which link distant localities in such a
way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away - has
transformed the work of imagination, enabling the emergence of Bcommunities of
sentiment^ beyond national borders (Appaduraï 1996). This transnational dimension of
Islam, as Ba public space of normative reference^ (Bowen 2004) opens up possibilities for
simultaneously redefining the liberal foundations of the public sphere - Ba social space
created by the reflexive circulation of discourse^ (Warner 2002: 62) - and the normative
basis of Islam.
This article focuses on one single episode of ‘halal’ speed-dating event, which took place
in central London in 2013, and which illustrates these cultural dynamics particularly well.
The association of a term derived from Islamic jurisprudence (‘halal’) with one derived from
the Bmatchmaking^ industry (Bspeed-dating^) is revealing of the new social imaginaries and
cultural hybrids that this research seeks to document. Informed by my long-term immersion
in the field of Islamic law in the UK, I analyse the tensions that emerge when gender norms
derived from Islamic prescriptions related to modesty and self-restraint come to contradict
the logics of the liberal market, which incites customers to maximise value for money.
Participants’ difficulty to perform Bthe good Muslim^ in the competitive environment of
Bmatch-making^ reveals the intrinsic fragility of religious norms and the inherent ambigu-
ities and doubts, which mark the modern human experience.
Another illustration of this fundamental uncertainty is the Islamic certification
Bhalal,^ situated at the intersection of commercial and religious categories. Indeed,
the category Bhalal^ no longer exclusively refers to behaviours and life habits autho-
rized by the sharia, nor does it concern only meat, but nowadays includes diverse goods
and services, the use of which opens up various aspects of life and enjoyment to
Muslims, while at the same time making them their own (Göle 2014:7). As this term
enters into currency, it gradually loses its original prescriptive value and takes on new
cultural and identitarian meanings. The symbolic legitimacy of the term Bhalal^ reveals
the tacit admission that activities thus labelled are not in fact entirely in line with
Islamic precepts according to which desires must be measured and controlled in daily
life (Id Yassine 2014). In this manner the rules of life as identified by the sharia have
little by little freed themselves from the pure domain of worship (‘ibadât) to adapt to
the larger sphere of human transactions (mu’amalât), thus contributing to a modern
lifestyle that is both urban and ethical. The practice of Bhalal^ speed-dating document-
ed in this article illuminates the changes in meaning at work when Bhalal^ enters the
commercial sphere and is presented as a guarantee of virtuous life.
In counterpoint to recent studies, which concentrate on the Bethical formation^ of the
subject via the pursuit of virtuous dispositions (Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006;
Agrama 2010), this article is less invested in studying the pedagogy of piety than in
examining actors’ ethical engagement via everyday practices of leisure, consumption
and sociability. I focus on Bframing^ dynamics (Goffman 1974) that occur in ordinary
interactional experiences and more specifically on moments of rupture as well as on
multiple-game reference frames which involve hybridation, translation and adaptation
processes. Because such situations generate ambiguities and misunderstandings, they
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provide interesting insights on the implicit rules that regulate the secular public sphere.
These situations of disjuncture between actors’ performances and the frame used by
receivers to make sense of them demonstrate that the quest for the Bgood ethical life^ -
that is, the search for Bliving rightly^ according to one’s faith – is a tightrope walk
during which each step involves finding the right balance between values that are not
all necessarily dictated by faith. These ambiguous performances illuminate the
fragmented and ambivalent nature of modern subjectivities based on the coexistence
of contrasted motivations, objectives, and identities (Ferrié 2004). It is this Bmoral
flexibility^ (Schielke 2009) which, in my view, best characterises Islamic modernity in
particular (Göle 2000) and religious modernity in general (Hervieu-Leger 2003). By
introducing new norms to the arenas of modern social life, Islamic moral subjectivity
implies lifestyles, forms of sociability, and ways of being in public, which disrupt the
liberal foundation of Western modernity.
The emergence of Bsharia^ in England: From the mosque to the market
The majority of English Muslims are of immigrant origin, coming from countries in
South Asia, particularly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. According to the 2001
census (Lewis 2010, 19), they represent 1.6 million people, that is 2.7% of the total
population. Their highest concentration is found in the big cities of the south and the
center of England, that is London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford, and Leeds. In
spite of rapid changes due to generational renewal, most mosques are differentiated not
only by ethnicity but also by their doctrinal teaching. The schools of thought identified
in English mosques include the currents of Barelwi, Deobandi, Jama’at-i-Islami, Ahl-i-
Hadith, Shiite et Ahmadiyya (Lewis 2002). Most Pakistanis belong to the Barelwi
tradition and consequently the mosques are strictly aligned according to the confes-
sional affiliation of the local community where they are implanted.
The appearance of Sharia councils, improperly called BIslamic tribunals^ by the
press, reflects the transformations of Muslim religious practice in England. Indeed, the
councils came into being in the eighties in response to the growing demand for divorce
amongst women in the community. In Islam, if men can unilaterally pronounce a talaq
to repudiate their wives, the wives themselves must go through the mediation of an
imam if they are to separate from their spouses. It is furthermore ironic that these
councils, perceived from outside as misogynistic institutions, are considered by the
women who go to them as a means of accessing their rights (frpù) within Islamic
tradition. These councils must not, however, be compared to tribunals since they may
only emit judicial opinions without any directly applicable legal value. They do not
pronounce any verdict. They only give rulings (fatwa), which the faithful are free to
take into consideration, or not.
If quite a few of these councils remain affiliated with mosques, some of them have
little by little left these specifically religious spaces (Bano 2004). In fact, one might say
that Sharia gained visibility precisely in extricating itself physically from the premises
of the mosque in order to be practiced in autonomous institutions. Before the creation
of councils, imams used to offer religious and spiritual guidance to the faithful in their
own local mosques, including mediation for conjugal disputes and the writing up of
divorce certificates. With the growth of divorces, the imams came to judge this activity
Contemporary Islam
as distancing them from their traditional function, that is the preparation of Friday
sermons and the provision of religious guidance in a wider sense. Thus councils
gradually freed themselves from the mosques to become institutions that specialized
in mediation and the issuing of Islamic divorce certificates. For example, the Islamic
Sharia Council UK (ISC-UK) in East London has recently moved into a former candy
shop, which has been repurposed, to this end, equipped with a waiting room and
offices. Consultation fees can be paid by credit card. The Muslim Law Sharia Council
(MLSC) had also long been hosted by the Muslim College at Ealing (an educational
institution) and is now located in a little office inWembley. Most cases are taken care of
by mail, without it being necessary for the clients to be physically present. It must also
be noted that the relationship of Bcustomer-service provider^ is quite different from that
of a spiritual guide toward a believer.
Indeed, the market has played an instrumental role in making Islamic difference
visible in the secular public sphere of England. Ironically, Bshariah law^ gained some
degree of public legitimacy when it was turned into a commodity on the constantly
growing market of identities. To respond to the desire of younger generations of
Muslims to incorporate Islamic norms and principles into their daily life, Bsharia
compliant^ products and services (offered by specialized insurance companies, banks,
law firms, etc.) have flourished in the major cities of the UK.
While first generation immigrants from South Asia primarily defined themselves
according to their ethnic origin, new generations born in England identify more
systematically by their belief in Islam and their belonging to the umma. According to
Tariq Modood (1990), this turning point was triggered by the Rushdie affair. The
protests against The Satanic Verses and the fatwa pronounced by Ayatollah Khomeini
opened the floodgates of an unprecedented wave of islamophobia fed by the press,
depicting Muslims as dangerous fundamentalists. This has since doubtless been exac-
erbated by the events of September 11 and the London attacks of July 2005.
For newer generations, the rediscovery of faith and the estrangement from their Bculture
of origin^ imply a new relationship with ethical living. The matrimonial encounters that I
describe in this article are an answer to these new demands among those who seek a
Bmiddle path.^ The vast majority of the young people I met during this research insists upon
the importance of a Muslim marriage and convey the need for assistance in their search for
the ideal spouse. While expressing reservations about Barranged marriages,^ they also
refuse to engage in practices that in their eyes would distance them from their faith. The
increasing demand for mediated encounters among young Muslims has opened a new
market niche within the British marriage industry, as illustrated by the multiplication of
public conferences dealing with marriage in Islam, Muslim marriage preparation courses,
Muslim dating websites and match-making events on offer in Britain’s main cities. Other
researches have confirmed this tendency (Rozario 2012; Ahmad 2012; Samuel 2012;
Rozario and Samuel 2012). The success of services like Bhalal speed dating^ is thus the
sign of a re-Islamisation that depends more upon market-mediated practices of sociability
than upon ideological indoctrination (i.e the mastery of sacred texts).
In the ethnographic vignette that follows, I illustrate the complex ‘framing’
(Goffman 1991) dynamics in which actors involved in a ‘halal speed dating’ event
are caught as they seek to be ‘read’ by others as observant Muslims. I highlight their
troubles to remain within the inherently precarious ‘halal’ frame and the justifications
they use to anchor their performance in the slippery terrain of Muslim matchmaking.
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BHalal^ speed dating
On a sunny Sunday afternoon in the beginning of the winter, a group of approximately
twenty people has convened in a seminar room of Birbeck College in central London.
People are not here to attend a lecture, rather the purpose of the gathering is an BIslamic
Marriage Event^ organised by the association Islamic Circles.5 These encounters have been
designed to provide a service to theMuslim community by helping singles find Bthe perfect
spouse.^ On the poster displayed at the room’s entrance door, the slogan BDo not date! Do
not cohabit! Get Married!^ can be read. Mirzan Raja, the organiser, has directed the
association for twelve years. He is 37 years old and a father of two. He was born in England
from migrant parents of Indian origin. Mirzan has been a member of a Sharia council for
some years. This experience has made him aware of the need for such a service. When
EnglishMuslimsmarry religiously they divorce in the sameway – a fact that reflects amore
general tendency in the English population. Thesemediated encounters allow both the never
married and the divorced to widen their marriage options.
Yet Bmatchmaking,^ even the BIslamic^ version, remains controversial. Mirzan admits
to regularly receiving threats from Muslims who consider his activity haram (illicit) and
contrary to Islam.When wemet in 2013, he explained that an angry woman spat in his face
during a similar event he had organised in the context of the Global Peace and Unity
Conference6 at the Excel convention centre in London’s Eastside. Nevertheless, the popu-
larity of these encounters continues to grow as can be seen by the proliferation of Bhalal^
dating services, as well as the continuous flow of participants entering the room on this early
Sunday afternoon. Mirzan gives several reasons for this popularity, one of which is that
parents are no longer able to set up potential spouses. Muslims of the second and third
generations no longer wish to marry a relative or someone from Bthe village^ of their
parents who can speak little English and/or is poorly educated. The moral impossibility of
dating or of having temporary romantically-oriented living arrangements in Islam and the
central role of the family encourages many single Muslims to turn towards new forms of
encounters certified Bhalal.^
According to Mirzan, the elders are no longer fulfilling their duty and their Bpost-
colonial thinking^ - which consists of blaming the English for everything that goes
badly in the community- is not in tune with the experience of the young. BMarriage is
all that remains to this generation and look at the result: the number of divorces keeps
growing! We need a Muslim Spring in England; we need to get rid of our leadership!^
he exclaims. Among the youth that were the subject of this research, the failure of the
elders in their traditional role as matrimonial facilitators was a common refrain. The
Bpost-colonial thinking^ that Mirzan refers to underlines the will to leave behind any
sense of victimhood in order to express a right to cultural difference. In fact, the
encounters show that the youth are no longer seeking to lie low in the name of
integration, but are rather embracing their unabashed BMuslimness.^ I see women
entering into the room in brightly coloured hijab and men with carefully groomed
beards. Other women are also present who are not covered or simply wear a scarf
5 Islamic Circles is a nonprofit community network established in eastern London in 2001. The network
organises many events such as classes, seminars, workshops, and gatherings related to Islam.
6 The Global Peace and Unity Conference is a periodic two-day conference organised by the Islam Channel in
the ExCel Convention Centre, located on the former London docks. According to Wikipedia, it is the biggest
multicultural and ecumenical event organised by Muslims in Europe, boasting over 55,000 visitors in 2006.
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around their necks, as well as men in jellaba, jeans, or a more classic suit. The dress
code ranges from the most traditional to Islamic (or simply metropolitan) chic.
Through the years Mirzan has created a number of subcategories for his events ever
since he realised that the generic category of BMuslim^ was too broad to answer the
specific needs of certain groups. Now he organises special events for converts, the over
40, students, professionals, East Asians, Arabs, and Bangladeshis. With the growing
presence of French Muslims in London, he recently had to put into place events
specifically designed for BFrench-speaking Muslims.^ Today’s event is devoted to this
new subcategory. Among the participants, we find two brothers from Mauritius, a
Senegalese man (the only black participant) and a majority of English and French
people of North African origin. Mirzan does not like having to separate people by
ethnic or national origin because he believes that what should unite Muslims is the
notion of umma (the community of believers). But as a businessman, social entrepre-
neur, and pragmatic militant (these are his own terms), he simply decided to respond to
the demand and leave aside the ideal of a unified community. These adaptations show
that ethnic origin remains an important -but no longer compulsory- criterion in the
search for a spouse. This fact has been verified by Fauzia Ahmad’s research (2012,
207) among the young Muslim women graduating from English universities.
Before the event, various forms to fill out as well as pamphlets explaining the
general principles of the event have been sent by email to the participants. One of them,
entitled, BGeneral Etiquette^ attracted my attention:
& Try to be in a state of ritual purity (wudū), if possible.
& The best way to begin is to recognise that you are a servant of Allah attending the
event because you, like the other participants, are seeking a spouse and you want
therefore to conduct yourself in the best manner possible.
& It is important to recognise that finding an appropriate spouse is an enormous
problem for Muslims today. This problem must be addressed practically and not
only via conferences and seminars bearing on the nature of marriage according to
fiqh (jurisprudence). The education of the entire community is necessary, including
parents and ulamas who also need to collaborate with social experts such as
conjugal counsellors and psychotherapists in order to find realistic solutions. We
hope that today’s encounter will reflect this humble attempt. Such initiatives are
new for our community. They must be evaluated according to Sharia principles. We
will need time to adjust, but these initiatives can improve only if members of the
community participate, take them seriously, facilitate their organisation, and make
constructive remarks.
& BIf I wear a niqab, should I take it off?^ No, that is entirely up to you.
& Prayer supplies will be placed at your disposal
& These encounters will continue to be organised until mosques, groups of Muslims,
community elders, and other married people take up this role and organise them
themselves
& Say your du’a (invocations) and ask Allah for advice before, during, and after the
event. Say the istikhârah7 prayer when it is time.
7 The ‘istikhâra prayer (al-salât al-istikhâra) is a prayer of consultation addressed to God during a test or for
coming to a decision.
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Little by little, the participants fill up the room. Some come with relatives and friends
who can peacefully watch the session from the back, after which Bthe brothers^ take
their place on one side and Bthe sisters^ on the other. A mother scans the men present
with an air of disapproval. BThey’re all over 40! Much too old for my daughter!^ she
complains as she sits next to me while making a sign to her 26 year old who has already
joined the group of Bsisters^.
At enrolment, the visitors each receive a numbered badge in order to preserve their
anonymity. Mirzan, the master of ceremonies, wears a shalwar kamiz (long shirt over
the wide puffy pants often worn by men in South Asia) and a little white crocheted
skullcap. For events organised for professionals he tends to prefer a suit, but today his
role is closer to that of an Belder,^ a wise person seeking to guide the young in their
journey towards married life. With his relaxed, plain-spoken manner and occasional
swearing, he embodies an odd mix of imam and businessman.
Undeniably charismatic, Mirzan presents the Brules of the game^. During this
fifteen-minute presentation, illustrated by PowerPoint slides, the participants are initi-
ated into the art of finding the ideal spouse. Mirzan explains how to write an effective
profile, present oneself modestly and pleasantly, and open communication with a
potential partner. He wants everything to be clear to everyone: the search for a spouse
is a full time job. Just like a job search, Bthe best allies are friends and family.^ BYou
must look for your spouse everywhere, at the workplace or at the university,^ he
explains. BStarting now your family is your cell phone and your internet connection!^
BSuccess depends on three things: 1) your intention: you must be ready for marriage, 2)
your attitude: it must be upstanding, 3) success comes from Allah!^
Having the Bright^ profile is the key to success. Index cards are given out in order
for the participants to mention their age and status (single, divorced, etc.) and to explain
what they are looking for and what they can offer in return. The participants can also
add a photo if they want to be more easily recognised. BWriting a profile is like writing
a resumé. To succeed you have to show yourself in the best possible light.^ The key to
writing a good profile, he tells us, is to take the exercise seriously. BIt’s an awkward
process, but once you have a good profile you can use it over and over!^ What’s more,
if the participants do not find their ideal partner today, they can join a database for
singles on findyourmuslimpartner.com, a website maintained by the association. 50,000
Muslims in London have already joined.
Mirzan now addresses matters of communication. He stresses that the English of the
Victorian era followed the principles of romantic love. He compares these principles to
the chivalrous code of the French Middle Ages and makes reference to Bcourtly love^
defended by the Three Musketeers. Though times have changed, Mirzan thinks that
these ideals are still valuable. Consequently he encourages the participants to adopt
gracious manners when interacting with each other. He gives examples of agreeable
conversation (BI say du’a for you.^; BI wish the best for you.^) and recommends that
they send a thank you SMS to the people whom they have met.
One extra minute is given to the participants to finish up their profile cards and they
are then divided into three groups for an exercise to Bbreak the ice.^ Visitors are asked
to introduce themselves and to answer the questions that Mirzan asks them as he
wanders from one group to another. BWhat is your favourite film? Do you know how to
cook? What is your favourite dish? How do your friends and family describe you? Do
you like to travel?^
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Since the encounter promotes marriage as its ultimate goal, the participants try to
present themselves as practicing believers. The effect of this is that they each compete
in appearing more pious than the other. A young woman explains that she tries not to
listen to music because it is Bharam^ (illicit, forbidden). One man says that his
favourite activity is to spend time with family. Another woman mentions that she
recently saw the film The Butler, which she found Bvery decent, very appropriate^ and
she repeats the adjectives several times throughout the conversation. Most of the
participants seem shy and avoid looking into the eyes of the opposite sex. Generally,
good manners and civility reign.
While men move between groups, the women remain seated and still. When
introductions are over, the participants write down the number of the persons they like
and with whom they would like to speak to later. A new group of men then joins the
group of women and the introduction game starts over again. Everything seems to be
going along in perfect harmony when suddenly something unexpected happens:
BCut the crap!^ cries a young woman of about 20, wearing a huge hijab, faux
snakeskin high heels, and slim-fit jeans. Clearly this woman is losing her patience.
BWhat do you expect of me if I become your wife?^
A barely perceptible gasp spreads throughout the room. The group is seized with
discomfort. Apparently, the young woman is not on her first try (an organiser tells me
he has seen her attend several encounters this month), and has no more time to waste.
She is looking for someone honest and specific in his expectations, someone capable of
stating clearly how he imagines married life. This woman’s performance transgresses
the norm of feminine modesty that such events try to promote, even if the women
generally have greater social skills than the men who struggle (and sweat!) to find
something appropriate to say.
BWe are here because we are all Muslims! I mean…I say my five prayers a day and I
want a wife who will help me support my din (religion),^ explains Faysal, who bravely
attempts to re-establish communication.
Careful to maintain cohesion, Mirzan goes to the group where the outburst has
occurred. He advises everyone to avoid putting off crucial questions. BMarriage has
nothing to do with love! It’s a matter of sharing values in common and understanding
each other!^ he explains in order to encourage them to put aside their shyness. These
remarks seem to contradict what he said earlier about courtly love. This is only in
appearance however because the message Mirzan wants to get across is simple:
marriage is based above all on the respect and the understanding of the other.
One by one, the participants recite their list of desired traits. Amir from Bristol wants
Bsomeone patient and who understands the basics of religion.^ Alia, a businesswoman
from the East of London, is looking for Bsomeone honest who likes to travel.^ Tahzeen,
27, works for an NGO and wants to marry Bsomeone down-to-earth, who has a sense of
humour, and who can encourage her in her religion.^ Strengthening faith through
marriage seems to be a leitmotif among the participants. While some of them come
accompanied by their parents, expressing this desire represents a form of resistance to
parental authority in one’s private life (Ahmad 2012, 205). The fact that young people
call on these marriage services bears witness to a certain degree of disconnection with
the experience of their elders.
As the introductions come to an end, the participants glance at the profiles displayed
on the wall so that they can choose the candidate most able to fulfil their dreams of
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married life. BInspired? Is there someone you want to talk to?^ I ask a woman wearing
a red silk hijab. She tells me that she prefers for a man to make the first move, as she
does not want to embarrass herself. Then she smiles and murmurs BDon’t turn around
now! In fact, I like the man in the blue shirt behind you.^
Some couples have already convened in the adjoining room while a group of men
gets ready for the asr prayer in the main room. Carpets lie next to each other on the
floor and men line up to replenish themselves with prayer after this performance which
seems to have exhausted them. So as not to disturb this moment of devotion, I go into
the hallway in the hope of starting a conversation. Soon I come across Fazel, a French
salesman of Algerian origin in his thirties who is about to leave. I ask (in French) if he
doesn’t want to wait a little longer to see if someone is interested in him.
Fazel: You see, I don’t think I’m going to find anyone in this kind of place. I’m
not very religious and everyone here seems so conservative!
Julie: So why did you choose to come here?
Fazel: Well, I’ve had two English girlfriends in the past and …. to be totally
honest with you, they really drink too much!
In a corner of the room, a Senegalese man is reading the Koran. No one has wanted to
speak with him. Despite the discourse of a unifying ideal (umma), ethnic origin is a real
obstacle when it comes to marriage. A little sad to see him by himself, I open a
conversation. It is the first time he has attended an event of this type. Divorced for two
years from a Senegalese woman whom had joined him in London, he is now ready to
Bpass on to something else.^
BThis time I don’t want to make the same mistake. I have to find someone here!
But it’s not easy when you’re black!^ he complains.
The event has attracted an important number of divorcees seeking their Bsoul mate^
after an arranged marriage that failed. If divorce remains a social taboo (especially for
women), divorced peoples’ status has improved in the last fifty years. Certain divorced
women with children have developed different expectations towards marriage. Accord-
ing to Mirzan, some of them choose to be co-wives, that is the second or third wife of a
married man. Mirzan claims that he receives five to ten requests a week from women
Bcomfortable with the idea of a part-time husband.^ He explains, BWomen with a career
don’t want a full time husband. They don’t have time for that.^ Unlike younger women,
they do not want the double burden of professional work and housework.
It is not, however, only the lack of time that drives them to become Bco-wives.^ Two
other factors enter in. The first is the stigma against divorcees. The second is the still
common recourse of seeking a spouse from abroad (15,500 women were admitted as
spouses into the United Kingdom in 2011, according to the figures of the Ministry of
the Interior). The popularity of Muslim marriage events is directly due, according to
Mirzan, to transformations of gender relations and the ever-growing gulf between the
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sexes. The Islamic version of Bspeed dating^ that Mirzan’s association provides
certainly offers a space for a non-liberal expression of Bmasculinity^ and Bfemininity.^
As the event ends and visitors begin to leave the room, I wonder if the dynamics that
I have just observed are representative of the alternative public spaces that have
emerged in the wake of the Global Islamic Revival. Indeed, can such spaces be
considered as a true Balternative^ for those trying to combine an urban lifestyle with
a Bgood ethical life,^ Muslim-style? (Billaud 2016). Or is it simply a commercial niche
for moral entrepreneurs like Mirzan? This ambiguity is without doubt a distinctive
characteristic of the Revival. As Ira Lapidus (1997) explains, contemporary Islamic
movements are a coin with two faces. On one side they are a response to the conditions
of modernity, to the centralisation of state powers and the development of capitalist
economies. On the other side, they are a cultural expression of modernity. The
insistence on Islamic values is not the expression of a return to the past but rather an
attempt to respond to present day problems by way of a renewed commitment to the
basic principles of Islam. Hence, matrimonial services labelled Bhalal^ continue to
attract those disappointed by the excesses of liberalism, especially when it concerns
intimate relations such as those that marriage is supposed to render sacred. And further,
as an English professor of Moroccan origin asked upon leaving the room, BWhere do
you find a partner when you don’t want to go to a club or to a bar?^
Islam as a form of distinction
BIslamic marriage events^ is clearly a euphemism used in order to avoid the term
Bspeed dating^ which implies the search for a form of Bfast food^ relationship.
However these events are named, they are nevertheless fully a part of the horizon of
leisure in the capital. For the last twenty years intense debates have emerged over the
kinds of free-time activities and places that are appropriate for those who follow the
Muslim faith. Such debates bear witness to a questioning of the normative basis of
Islam. More generally they demonstrate the moral flexibility of new generations of
English Muslims whose identity does not partake in a personal experience with
immigration. Paradoxically, Bhalal^ spaces of sociability offer up new opportunities
for meeting someone outside of traditional circles (the mosque, the family, etc.). These
spaces attract a generation of young (and not-so-young) people who take their religion
seriously and who want to open up their possibilities while enjoying themselves within
the limits – constantly re-negotiated – of their religion.
BHalal^ matchmaking events have therefore opened a space of experimentation in
which British Muslims collectively learn a common language for talking about rela-
tionships. However, the moments of tensions, misunderstandings, the dynamics of
inclusion/exclusion documented here illustrate that far from being self-evident, Islamic
norms remain the object of constant negotiations as to what constitutes proper
Bmuslimhood^ and Bpiety ,^ and beyond these, adequate norms of behaviour and
Bcivility .^
In counterpoint to liberal definitions of the public sphere as a space of
Bcommunicative action^ (Habermas 1989) where beliefs, morality and civic virtue
are conceived as inessential in the process of setting public debate in motion (and
should therefore be interiorised), the practices documented in this article reveal a mode
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of investment of the public sphere where virtues and morality play an essential role.
However, the moral forces that guide Muslim believers on their path to a virtuous life
are not systematically derived from Islam but are rather part of a global lifestyle
interpenetrated with values, which belong to their immediate environment. These
values are not spread from the limited space of the mosque, but circulate also through
consumer practices, everyday leisure, and ways of being in public. The line of
separation between civic reason (deliberative) and religious morality (disciplinary and
normative) established by the liberal conception of the public sphere is being
reconfigured through these everyday interactions. By collectively redefining norms of
gendered behaviours, the Muslim dating scene contributes to shape a Bcounter-public^
(Warner 2002) where a specific cultural sensitivity and alternative conceptions of
Bcivility^ are expressed and performed.
However, interactions documented here underline that the behavioural code, far
from being obvious, is the object of constant reminders, performances, and counter-
performances. The frontiers of the moral community are influenced by a combination
of types of knowledge which ‘frame’ interactions in ambiguous ways, forcing actors to
constantly justify their interventions (Goffman 1974). There are on one hand the kinds
considered authoritative (the vertical) and on the other, everyday habits and experiences
(the horizontal). Far from being fixed and rigid, these frontiers require an effort from
actors who must therefore take part in a certain number of rituals and adhere to a code
of conduct in order to negotiate said frontiers. Nevertheless, the degree of obedience
and involvement remains largely elastic, as demonstrated by the impatient woman’s
somewhat abrupt speech.
The moral repertoires identified here follow the dynamics of Bordinary ethics^ as
described by Michael Lambek (2010, 2), namely, a relatively implicit aspect of
morality. In a secular context ethics is based on negotiations and compromise rather
than on following a precise set of given rules. It is based on practice rather than
knowledge or faith and it develops without drawing undue attention to itself. Thus
judgments about Bgood^ and Bevil^ are forged horizontally, through everyday interac-
tions and sociability, rather than vertically through doctrine and institutions.
BThe ethical does not simply go without saying. Indeed, ethics can be found not
only in the balance between continuity and innovation but in the movement or
tension between the ostensible (manifest, explicit, conspicuous, declared,
avowed, certain, normative, necessary) and the tacit (latent, implicit, ambiguous,
subjunctive, aporetic, paradoxical, uncertain, transgressive, possible), and be-
tween the application of criteria and the recognition of their limits ». (Lambek
2010 : 28)
In contrast to Saba Mahmood’s (2001, 2005) view according to which pious actors seek to
cultivate virtue through bodily discipline, the practices of young EnglishMuslims presented
here are characterized by a performative staging of the self. I use the notion of
Bperformance^ (Goffman 1969) here not to insinuate that the practices of actors are cynical
or alienated responses to dominant norms. Rather, Bperformance^ highlights their recogni-
tion and their participation in a moral system, which necessitates a certain use of the body.
Indeed, rather than seeking to Bcultivate virtue^ by the embodied mastery of prescriptive
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behaviours, actors try instead to cultivate a sense of distinction in using their bodies as a
vehicle of meaning. The unabashed and willful adoption of Islamic stigma symbols (hijab
for women, a beard for men, or collective prayer) is closer to what Nilüfer Göle (2003)
perceives as a means of questioning the hegemonic discourse of liberal, secular Western
modernity via a re-appropriation of controversial symbols meant to divert their meaning.
Externally perceived as signs of submission, they become a means of self-affirmation as
well as affirmation of the collective identity in a community of practice that is in the process
of forming (Wenger 1998). While Mahmood tends to overdetermine the pious leanings of
actors in insisting on techniques of subjectivation, one could rather see in their performances
the shifting signs of cultural influences and diverse Bmoral rubrics^ - to take up the
expression of Deeb and Harb (2013).
In her ethnography of dance events in Greece, Jane Cowan (1990) explains that
ambiguous social meanings are incorporated into and expressed by the body, not only
through discipline, but also through pleasant forms of day-to-day sociability. The
marriage encounters, just like the dance events in their Greek context as described by
Cowan, are the place where men and women experience themselves as gendered
subjects and where gendered differences and other social hierarchies are established,
even celebrated. And yet, these encounters also reveal the moral tensions at work when
an actor fails to conform to the behavioural expectations related to his or her sex. Indeed,
the participants find themselves torn between their desire to embody the gender norms
defined by Islam, and their rights as consumers of a service they have paid for. Because
the symbolic universe of actors is not monolithic, because it is penetrated by multiple
influences, actors’ performances underline not so much the power of the norm as its
intrinsic fragility. By joining in the game of ‘halal^ encounters, more or less conscious-
ly, participants find themselves having to play the role or follow the Bgood Muslim^
script. The incapacity or the refusal of certain group members to follow the rules of the
game emphasizes the processual (Schielke 2009; Ferrié 2004) and fundamentally
creative and performative nature of religious identity (Turner 1986). Furthermore, these
striking creative solutions shift the meaning of contemporary Bhalal.^ From its original
usage as prescriptive injunction, it becomes itself a new cultural repertoire.
Conclusion
In an article published in HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Fadil and Fernando
(2015) warn against the excesses they perceive in current anthropological studies of
Bordinary Islam^ (Schielke and Debevec, 2012; Soares and Osella 2009; Marsden
2005; Deeb and Harb 2013). According to them, the way the concept of Beveryday^
has been recuperated by anthropologists of Islam emphasises only one side of the
paradigmatic debate between Bpower/agency^ and Bunity/diversity^ while insisting on
human creativity in the face of the weight of norms. Moreover, putting the spotlight on
Bthe everyday^ fails to furnish the analytical elements, which would allow for an
understanding of the phenomenon of piety. Worse yet, the theoretical framework of
BIslam mondain,^ insisting as it does on the inconsistencies and contradictions of actors
in search of virtue, denigrates in their view the reality and ontology of ultra-orthodox
ways of life. In focusing on Bordinary Muslims^ this kind of anthropology would make
Bextra-ordinary^ other Muslims, for example those who choose to follow Salafism.
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What I am seeking to show through this ethnographic vignette is the possibility of
thinking of piety in totality, or more precisely, the possibility of considering the search
for a virtuous life and of the everyday all at once. Indeed, if the phenomenon of the
Islamic Revival denotes a certain unprecedented and worldwide renewal of interest of
ordinary Muslims (that is, those who have no formal religious training) in exegetical
texts, theological reasoning, and the quest for virtue, the Beveryday^ remains the key
place for the unexpected to occur. Thus, even if the Revival spanning the Muslim world
since the Seventies8 implies a certain discipline of the self (Mahmood 2005), a certain
relationship to the world and to knowledge, its manifestations are far from forming a
monolithic framework of practices. In their search for a way of life in line with their
faith, Muslims cannot extirpate themselves from the Bimmanent frame^ (Taylor 2007)
that marks their immediate environment. They cannot either curtail their social imag-
ination, enlarged and transformed as it has been since the 1980s as a result of migration
and electronic media (Appaduraï 1996). As I have explained elsewhere (Billaud 2016),
morality is deeply anchored in the everyday experience of modernity. According to
Charles Taylor (1989), our modern conception of the Bself^ is linked to morality. In
attempting to portray the background for the moral and spiritual motivations of modern
subjects, however, Taylor identifies a transition from an external meaning of the Bself^
in which signification derives from extraordinary actions to an interior meaning where
signification lies amidst everyday actions. Morality in a secular age is thus fundamen-
tally immanent and consequently inexorably flexible. By necessity, it finds its inspira-
tion in multiple and hybrid sources.
Far from being opposed, the immanent and the transcendent frames constantly
interact and are therefore fashioned by the multiple and contradictory forces of
globalisation. A new public culture (in the sense of a space that enables the public
expression of cultural difference) is emerging from these constellations, which is
neither totally anchored in the ideological paradigms of Western modernity nor literally
faithful to Muslim tradition. Some see in these developments the first signs of a post-
Islamic era (Roy 1999; Bayat 2007; Burgat 2001). But should we not rather deduce that
Islamic modernity comes into being by way of a kind of moral flexibility internal to the
Islamic sphere itself? This flexibility gives access to spaces and ways of being in public
which are distinct, without being entirely separate, from those originating in the liberal
tradition. This form of public distinction should not be interpreted as a form of
radicalization but rather as a sign of a new generation of Muslims, whose imagination
has been shaped by the memory of postcolonial migration and a specific subjectivity
(as British and Muslims) and which strives to participate in public life in its own terms.
Fadil and Fernando put forth a critique of the literature, which has mobilised the
notion of Bthe everyday.^ In my view, their critique reflects their own bias against more
orthodox ways of life such as those documented in researches on piety led by Talal
Asad. To conceive piety as a process which mainly consists in disciplining the self
tends to close off a vital element of our research: it forecloses examining the impos-
sibility fatally confronting any modern individual in search of perfect purity of life and
8 The phenomenon of the Islamic Revival is defined by Saba Mahmood (2005,3) as a broad movement of a
return to the sources of Islam. The term refers not only to the activities of political groups in conjunction with
the state, but also more largely to a religious ethos and sensibility spread throughout contemporary Muslim
societies. This sensibility has a palpable public presence in England, which is manifested in the proliferation of
neighborhood mosques, Islamic teaching institutions as well as of products and services labeled Bhalal.^
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living. As I see it, there is here a parallel with anthropologists who seek for purity in
their subject matter and are tragically doomed not to find it. We must mourn this wish.
And yet it is in this very lack of purity, in the contradictions and tensions that result, that
we can find the richest sources of meaning for both the discipline itself as well as for a
better understanding of the human experience in general.
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